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In a regime in transition with a legacy of civil war, institutions
that govern a society are often destabilized as a host of state
and non-state authorities vie for legitimacy in order to gain or
maintain power. In such a context, the control over land and
the institutions that govern it often become central to such
power struggles. The idea of “fragmented sovereignty”  helps
to explain the conflicts over land control between the state and
non-state actors (Lund 2011: 887-9). Sovereignty is generally
understood “as unlimited and indivisible rule by a state over a
territory and the people in it” (Agnew 2008: 437) and where
“governments generally claim legal sovereignty […] in the
name of the state” (Lund 2011: 887).1
The dynamics of land control and access in Myanmar will
be used to demonstrate this concept. This country has faced
1 In this study, part of the state is conceptualized in the Weberian tradition, as
“a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and
more or less well coordinated by an executive authority’” (Skocpol 1979: 29).
However, the acknowledgement of these structures does not mean that the
state should be “taken as a free-standing entity [...] located apart from and
opposed to another entity called society” (Mitchell 1996: 94-5). Instead, state
structures are more accurately described as a “structural effect” or an “entity
[that] comes to seem something much more than the sum of the everyday
activities that constitute it, appearing as a structure containing and giving
order and meaning to people’s lives” (Mitchell 1996: 94-5).
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challenges to state unification since its independence, as
demonstrated by six-decades of civil war between the Bamar-
dominant state and multiple ethnic groups fighting to gain
greater autonomy. These conflicts arose after independence in
1948, but heightened after the 1962 military coup that toppled
the nascent civilian government.2 In an attempt to put an end
to decades of civil war, the Thein Sein Government prioritized
a national cease-fire, starting in 2011, raising the profile of
ethnic politics. 
Nevertheless, the long-standing conflicts in Myanmar did
not only start off with ethnic-based claims. In fact, in the early
decades, Myanmar’s armed conflicts included sizeable insur-
rections from the Communist Party of Burma, whose members
wanted to seize power from the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom
League (AFPFL), the main political party from 1945 to 1964
(Smith 2007: 10-12).3 But after so many decades of entrenched
fighting between the military government and various armed
ethnic groups, some like David Keen (2001:8 in Smith 2007: 10)
even argue that this “conflict generate[d] ethnicity.” This
means to say that over time, conflicts over socio-political issues
took increasingly became framed as ethnic in nature—so much
so that many people now understand the armed conflicts in
Myanmar primarily as ethnic ones. This has led long-term
Myanmar political analyst Robert Taylor to argue that “ethnic
politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity” (1982: 7)
—highlighting the role of ethnicity as the main obstacle to a
unified nation-state. 
2 On 2 March 1962, Ne Win staged a coup d'état and reclaimed power. After his
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government collapsed in 1988, and
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to power, another
wave of armed ethnic groups proliferated. 
3 The CPB was also involved with the struggles of ethnic armed groups until
the 1990s.
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Against this backdrop, land reform was initiated in 2012
with the passing of two new laws—the Farmland Law and the
Vacant, Fallow, Virgin (VFV) Land Law—which essentially
introduced titling-based tenure reforms to create a land
market, in large part to support central government’s drive to
increase land-based investments. Since the reform started, the
contest for land control has become a priority in the country,
and is a key issue for ethnic minority groups who continue to
compete with the central state for control over resources.
Thus, an analysis of the land question in Myanmar and its
impact on rural poverty is incomplete without addressing the
way ethnic politics challenges sovereignty through the institu-
tions that govern land access and control.4 
The first section of this paper will discuss the interaction
of state sovereignty, ethnic politics and land control in a
regime in transition by elaborating on a) the basis of the ethnic
challenge to state sovereignty; b) why property rights is
central to state-building in a regime transition; and c) how
counter-claims further structures sovereignty. The second
section takes an empirical look at how these dynamics play out
in the uplands of Chin State by a) describing the evolution of
the customary land institutions; b) exploring the way state
laws that promote private property impact on social relations
and poverty; and c) investigating the emergence of counter-
claims to state laws. The article concludes with a discussion of
implications for understanding land control and access in
dynamic contexts such as this one.
4 Institutions are often defined as patterns of formal and informal rules and
relations (e.g. North 1990, Steinmo and Thelen 1992), but this study is partial
to Lund’s (2011: 886) definition, which sees formal and informal rules: (1) as
“manifestations of structures; of power relations which, in the course of (some)
time, establish a structure of entitlement and exclusion”; (2) as the
configurations of actors acting to define and enforce collectively binding
decisions and rules; and (3) as “an arena where competing social actors
struggle to influence the way decisions are made.” 
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State Sovereignty, Ethnic Politics and Land 
in a Transition Regime
Basis of Ethnic Challenge to Sovereignty
Property indicates that there are relations among social actors
(individuals or groups) with regard to the land that “exist at
the level of laws and regulations, cultural norms and social
values” that are “sanctioned” by “the state or some other form
of politico-legal authority” (Sikor and Lund 2009: 4; see MacPh-
erson 1978). This does not only refer to legal-Western forms of
property, but also customary forms that are sanctioned by non-
state authorities. Like citizen rights, property rights are polit-
ical in the sense that they influence who gets what resources.
Both, “in their broadest sense exist only to the extent that they
are produced, endorsed, and sanctioned by some form of legit-
imate authority,” but since legitimacy must be “continuously
(re)-established through conflict and negotiation” (ibid: 8), a
central question over property in the context of state-building
is: Who has the authority to sanction the rights that determine
access and control to land, and what is this authority based on?
Answering this question requires a conceptualization of
the state as a “site of contestation” (Jessop 2007: 37) when the
post-independence Myanmar state was formed. Martin Smith
pointed out in his book, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of
Ethnicity, “it was more on the basis of city-states than of a
nation that any political structure was to develop” (1991: 32).
Towards the end of British rule, groups like the Shan, the
Karen, and the Chin, aspired to return to the levels of
autonomy they enjoyed prior to the colonial rule. One of the
Chin leaders, Kio Mang, ex-chief of Hakha, who signed the
Panglong Agreement on behalf of the Chin people on 12
February 1947 said, “We want to rule our country by ourselves
according to our own political systems” (Sakhong 2003: 212).
Partly for reasons of faulty translation and misunderstanding
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of the term “federation” (Sakhong 2003: 213-5) and partly for
reasons of economic dependence on Burma Proper (Smith
1999: 80), ultimately, Chinland became a Special Division under
Burma Proper.
These groups saw themselves as distinct nation-states that
opted to create a multi-national state called the Union of
Burma by signing the Panglong Agreement in 1947.5 “A nation
is a cultural entity, a body of people bound together by a
shared cultural heritage.” Cultural bonds include “a common
language, religion, traditions and historical consciousness,”
which often go hand in hand with the demand for self-govern-
ment (Heywood 2004: 98-101). Self-determination is at the
heart of these political demands. This could be defined as “the
right to freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development …
[and]… the rights to possess their natural wealth and natural
resources in their own respective homelands” (Sakhong 2004).
While Aung San might have held out promises of
autonomy, the Myanmar state soon came to be dominated by
the Bamar, especially after the military coup of 1962. To this
day, the extension of the Myanmar state is seen by many ethnic
minority groups as an extension of the interests of the Bamar
through the structures of the state. 
State’s Guarantee of Property Rights in a Transition Regime
A state’s need to strengthen sovereignty tends to be
heightened after a regime transition whose central reason is to
shed an old, ineffective regime and to adopt a new one that can
increase the state’s chances to strengthen and perpetuate its
rule. On 7 November 2010, as part of the seven-step "roadmap
to democracy” proposed in 2003 by the State Peace and Devel-
5 Karen, Karenni, Mon and Arakan States could be said to have signed up to
these principles when the first version of the 1947 Constitution was drafted
(Sakhong 2004).
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opment Council (SPDC),6 the first general election in twenty
years was held in Myanmar in accordance with the constitution
(approved in a referendum in May 2008).7 This military-initi-
ated regime transition “represents change within continuity,
the reorganization or restructuring of […] an institution, rather
than its abolition or replacement” (Heywood 2002: 215). Even
though the state is relying relatively less on outright force to
rule, as demonstrated by a relatively greater use of political
rather than military means to address the “ethnic problem”
(Keenan 2012), the Bamar-dominant state still seeks to extend
its indivisible rule through the extension of its legal authority.
However, this does not mean that the state does away with
coercion, as the legitimacy of law must always be backed up by
force (Heywood 2002). In this way, the state can claim to abide
by the “rule of law,” and justify its use of force if the “rule of
law” is transgressed.
Extension of its legal authority involves the introduction of
a private property model embodied in the two new land laws
passed in 2012. Through attempts to shape property institu-
tions that will grant, administer, and guarantee rights, these
laws exemplify an approach to state-formation that is partic-
ular to this period in Myanmar’s history. The enforcement of a
single property regime throughout the territory is central to
state-building and has to do with a “recursive constitution of
6 The military government changed its names since the 1962 coup when
General Ne Win and the 24-member socialist Union Revolutionary Council
took power. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) lasted from 1964
until its demise in the popular student-led uprising of 1988. After that, the
military government was headed by the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC), which in 1997 became the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC).
7 The first was in 1990, which the National League for Democracy won by a
landslide, but the military government refused to transfer power to Aung San
Suu Kyi and her party. The second was in 2010, but it was largely considered
not free and fair. The most recent elections was held in November 2015 which
brought the NLD another landslide victory. 
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property and institutional authority” (Sikor and Lund 2009: 2).
If the state has the ability to secure property for people, the
state would be able to constitute citizens’ relationship to public
authority (Lund 2011: 887-9) or in a larger sense, between state
and citizen (Sikor and Lund 2009: 8). Particularly after a regime
transition, such as in Myanmar, the state likely wants its polit-
ical subjects to know and accept that it is a force with which
people must contend and the primary institutional actor that
guarantees rights. This should be the case even if subjects do
not necessarily approve of this arrangement, particularly in
conflict-affected areas.
Private property institutions could provide tenure security
to lowland farmers who are more accustomed to a private
property model, but this model can also increase the vulnerab-
ility and poverty of communities who have practiced
customary largely communal tenure and who have farmed
largely for subsistence.8 This includes the hill communities in
Chin State, spilling into Rakhine State, and in the forested
uplands of Karen, Kayah, Kachin, and Shan States. The
Farmland Law of 2012 provides no protection to largely
communal customary land systems. In some areas,
communities’ claims to customary land have become even
more tenuous after the flooding in August 2015, which forced
communities to resettle to and cultivate new areas. In addition,
the Farmland Law specifically states that the practice of
shifting cultivation, a form of uplands agro-forestry cultiva-
tion, should be eradicated. As a result, land that does not fit the
definitions of the Government of Myanmar laws is considered
“empty” and unoccupied, falling under the jurisdiction of the
VFV Land Law—which allows the state to transfer up to 50,000
8 In the lowlands, the need to rationalize the rice and taxes to be extracted
from local farmers motivated the British to introduce a system to assess
individual land holdings and to introduce the idea of an “individual
landholder’s right” (Furnivall 1991 [1939]: 116-31).
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acres of land to an investor for up to 30 years. A recent devel-
opment that may offer an opening to revise these laws is the
National Land Use Policy adopted by the government in
January 2016. Significantly, the Policy says that “customary
land use tenure systems shall be recognized in the National
land law in order to ensure awareness, compliance and applica-
tion of traditional land use practices of ethnic nationalities,
formal recognition of customary land use rights, protection of
these rights and application of readily available impartial
dispute resolution mechanism” (Part VIII).
Given the gaps in the laws, many hill communities fear
that their claim to land will be left in a legislative vacuum ,
which currently makes them highly vulnerable to land dispos-
session in the wake of Myanmar’s return to the global
economy. Since 1991, when the military government started to
promote a market economy, much of these land concessions
have disproportionately been allocated from ethnic minority
states. According to 2012 data from the Government of
Myanmar’s Department of Agricultural Planning, 70% of 3.4
million acres is located in the conflict-affected Kachin State
and Thaningtharyi Region.9 This has led many ethnic minority
groups to interpret the current land reform as the central
government’s efforts to use extra-coercive means to gain
control of the territory that they have been defending for the
last six decades, sometimes described as “ceasefire capitalism”
(Woods 2011). 
How Counter-Claims Interact with Sovereignty
That being said, even if the state wants to have its authority
unchallenged by its subjects, it may not always fulfil its
contract to protect the same rights for all citizens—as it assigns
9 Public data from the Department of Agricultural Planning, Government of
Myanmar 2012. This is the last year that the DAP included state-owned
agribusiness concessions into its publicly available Agriculture in Brief.
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different rights to different groups depending on identity
markers such as ethnicity, race, or political affiliations, leading
to an "uneven democratization" (Yashar 2005). This was exper-
ienced as incomplete political settlements by Myanmar’s ethnic
minorities in the first round of ceasefires which started in
1989. This breaking of the state-citizen contract can, in turn,
reinforce the counter-claims of non-state institutional actors
competing with the state over control of land. Thus, the state’s
attempts to strengthen sovereignty, particularly after a regime
transition, “may be successful and consolidate just as they may
be challenged and undone.” This is therefore not a straightfor-
ward or predictable process. Ultimately, if the state wants to
secure its sovereignty in a divisive multi-ethnic country, it will
likely have to compromise over who gets to define institutions
that govern land access and how these institutions will look—
an issue prioritized by ethnic armed groups in the political
dialogue that follows the signing of the National Ceasefire
Agreement.
This article demonstrates that challenges to the state’s
institutions tend to vary with the political interaction between
a particular ethnic minority group and the central govern-
ment. While the Karen National Union (KNU) has been able to
mount a strong challenge to the Government of Myanmar, the
response in Chin State has been more moderate. As opposed to
the KNU’s much better armed and centralized authority—
which has presented a formidable challenge to the Government
of Myanmar for the last six decades—the significantly smaller
armed group the Chin National Front (CNF) and a history of
clan-based political structures have prevented it from unifying
as a solid political force. In addition, resource-poor Chin State
has come to rely on the Bamar state for material support. 10
10 Author interview with township level administrators in Mindat Township,
Chin State in February 2013.
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Chin State is currently the largest recipient of a poverty allevi-
ation grant from the central government. 
While this paper does not seek to compare the way the
KNU and the CNF challenge the Government of Myanmar’s land
administration, it is worth noting that the KNU already has a
land policy that is used to administrate areas that have not
been administered by the Government of Myanmar given the
history of civil war there. Despite the fact that the CNF never
had the resources or as wide a mandate to administrate
territory in Chin State, some of the members of the CNF’s
central executive committee are taking a lead in the national-
level negotiations over the protection of ethnic minorities’
customary land. 
How the Contest Plays Out: The Case of Chin State 
Bordering India in Myanmar’s northwest, Chin State sits on a
steep mountain range—popularly known as “the Chin Hills.”
Among the hill communities of Myanmar, the Chin socioeco-
nomic systems have until now been relatively less disrupted by
armed conflict, population increase, and the country’s opening
to the market economy.11 Thus, they have largely maintained
traditional property institutions that have strong communal
elements. 
Chin State is considered to be the poorest in Myanmar, as
demonstrated by the Integrated Household Living Conditions
Assessment (IHLCA 2011) conducted by the United Nations,
which found that 73% of its population of 478,690 people is
estimated to live below the poverty line.12 However, because
this tool measures expenditure levels for food and non-food
items, this estimation may not be the most accurate—since an
11 Its growth has been moderated by the simultaneous migration of Chins out
of the state into other countries, notably the United States. 
12 Per the 2014 Provisional Results of the 2014 Myanmar Population and
Housing Census.
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economy that primarily produces for consumption rather than
market exchange is likely to measure low on consumption
expenditures.13 This self-provisioning and the fact that there
are few labor markets in Chin State likely explain why employ-
ment is only 54%. 
Here, the clash between customary communal property
institutions and private property institutions becomes quite
apparent in terms of its impacts on local communities and
their risks for greater poverty. This clash is already showing
negative impacts on communities’ social and material
wellbeing, as the market threatens to undermine the
customary property systems and strong “moral economy”
(Thompson 1971, Scott 1976) or economic relations rooted in
reciprocity and exchange. 
This tension between the institutions has provoked a
number of nascent counter-claims from a number of Chin
political entities, including the CNF, political parties and civil
society organizations. This response plays on ethnic politics
and could significantly change the state-subject relationship
between the Chins and the Bamar state, which has historically
been distant. 
From Tribal Past to Nation-State
In The Art of Not Being Governed , James Scott (2009: ix) argues that “the
hill peoples of Zomia are best understood as runaway, fugitive,
maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia,
been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys—
slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée labor, epidemics, and warfare.”14
13 Chin State does indicate other indicators of poverty, such as child
malnutrition-including a 58% prevalence for stunting (low height for age),
which is created by chronic malnutrition. Accessed 10 September 2014
<http://www.unicef.org/myanmar/Chin_State_Profile_Final.pdf >
14 Zomia is a geographical term covering the uplands of seven nation states in
South East Asia and coined in 2002 by Dutch historian Willem van Schendel
and popularized by Scott in his book The Art of Not Being Governed (2009).
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But instead of the oppressors being the Bamar, several historians
argued that it was indeed the Shan from whom the Chin fled when
the former expanded their control to the Kale Valley with the
construction of Kalemyo in 1395 (Luce 1959: 26-7; Carey and Tuck
1896). 
Chin society was tribal and ruled by traditional chiefs.
Some scholars say that there are six major tribal groups identi-
fied as 1) Asho with 6 sub-tribes; 2) Cho or Sho with 8 sub-
tribes; 3) Khuami or M’ro with 7 sub-tribes; 4) Laimi with 17
sub-tribes; 5) Mizo or Lushai with 12 sub-tribes; and 6) Zomi or
Kuki with 13 sub-tribes (Vumson 1986: 40). Though this is
currently under debate, some sources count as many as 63 sub-
tribes in total. A tribal group “is a group of the same people
whose ancestors made their settlement in a certain place
together, after their common original homeland in the
Chindwin Valley was destroyed” (Sakhong 2003: 18). For
example, the descendants of the settlers in the area called Lai-
lung (central area) are called the Laimi tribe while the descend-
ants of the settlers in the northern part of Chinram are called
Zomi. As populations grew, the tribal groups broke up into
smaller settlements and relocated. Divided by geography, the
tribal groups further differentiated into sub-tribes, each with
their own dialects and customs. Though the tribes followed a
similar pattern of worship of the Khua-hrum or guardian guard
of a community, this was not sufficient to unite the Chin. As a
result, “people’s identification with each other was tribally
exclusive and their common national identity remained
elusive.” (Sakhong 2003: xv). 
Chin society was greatly changed by the British annexation
in 1896 and the arrival of the Christian missionaries between
1899 to 1905 (Sakhong 2003: 106). Together with Christian
conversion, the colonial legacy removed Chinland from its
isolation and forced it on a path of de-tribalization (Sakhong
2003: xvi). When the new state borders of Burma, India and
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Bangladesh were created, the eastern part became Chin State
in Myanmar, the western part became Mizoram State in India
and a small area integrated into Bangladesh (Sakhong 2003:
xv). The departure of the British and the Chin peoples’ negoti-
ation with the interim government of Ministerial Burma
created a significant opportunity to further unify the Chin as a
single political entity.
Given the state’s history, there are observable differences
in land ownership patterns between Northern and Southern
Chin. The north had more elaborate political organization,
more permanent settlement, and higher levels of capital
accumulation, resulting in the establishment of bigger towns
(Lehman 1963). One tribal chief in the north explained that the
Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 attempted to abolish concentra-
tion of lands in the hands of the tribal chiefs and to make land
access more equal in a communal system.15 In the south, which
was less influenced by missionaries, many villages tended to be
more traditional. There, chiefs and their descendants continue
to claim ownership of large parcels of land. This is corrobor-
ated by a recent study on Chin customary land systems which
found that certain clans around Mindat Township in the south
claim historical ownership to large swathes of land, to which
access is granted in exchange for rents (Ewers 2015). 
In most parts of the state, where survival was a challenge
and infrastructure was at a minimum, management of land and
livelihoods via private property arrangements would have also
led to a sub-optimal outcome for people.16 This system would
have driven the Chin to struggle in “a game against nature,”
instead of working with each other (Ostrom 1990: 12). To
15 Interview with tribal chief by author on 7 May 2015.
16 Here ‘sub-optimal’ borrows from the logic of the “prisoners’ dilemma” from
game theory in which lack of cooperation results in all players losing-- in this
case through the collective destruction of nature commonly referred to as a
“tragedy of the commons.” 
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survive, the Chin developed a “safety-first maxim,” (Scott 1976:
29) in which “living is attained often at the cost of a loss of
status and autonomy” (Scott 1976: 7). In this way, customary
communal forms of property institutions in many parts of Chin
State, evolving over centuries, gained legitimacy in the eyes of
those who continue to abide by them. The customary land
systems of Chin State were not only recognized as the property
institutions by the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896, customary law
was also recognized by the Panglong Agreement signed on 12
February 1947 between Chin leaders and General Aung San,
with the involvement of the British. Chinland became a Special
Division in Ministerial Burma in which it was allowed to follow
its own customary laws—an entire set of legal institutions
different from those of the central government. Even when the
1953 Land Nationalization Act was passed, which nationalized
all land under the name of the state, the actual land tenure
practices in Chin State were not affected. In summary, the
colonial legacy, the appearance of the armed group the CNF in
1988, and the relatively low interest on the part of the central
government to administrate this remote state helped to
maintain a parallel system of property institutions up until the
passage of the 2012 Farmland Law and VFV Land Law. 
Chin Customary Land Systems 
In Chin society, land is a territory that symbolizes identity,
spiritual value, and culture. These values have been consec-
rated in a number of nature worship practices that continue to
this day—often practiced with the annual farming cycle, even
though many Chin people have been converted to Chris-
tianity.17 Based on these values, rules for the collective
17 There is a much higher ratio of Christians among Northern than Southern
Chin. According to Sakhong (2000), in his book Religion and Politics among the
Chin People in Burma (1896-1949), although all the tribes and villages follow the
same pattern of belief systems, it is still distinct enough between the tribes
that Khua-hrum did not unite the entire Chin people under a single religion. 
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management of a common pool of resources were created.
While rules varied from village to village and were unwritten,
they defined the right-holders and their rights with regard to
the land. Passed down through generations, these rules are
supervised by a local chief (Food Security Working Group 2010) who
is usually a descendant of the founder of a particular clan, and
who acts on behalf of Khua-hrum—the guardian god
considered the ultimate owner of land (Sakhong 2000). Tradi-
tionally, the chief theoretically owned this land on behalf of
the Khua-hrum, and he and his council were vested with
powers of rights enforcement, dispute resolution, land redistri-
bution, or if necessary, changing the rules in consultation with
the community to adapt to new circumstances.
For many upland ethnic groups, including the Chin, house-
hold and kinship networks are the foundation of social organ-
ization. Thus, rights are derived from the acceptance into a
social network through birth, marriage, or various kinds of
transactions. A common trait among these communities is that
this village land is only meant to be used by those residing in
the place, and in principle nobody is allowed to sell the land to
anyone  outside the community. Land has to be returned to the
common pool when someone leaves the community, but land
would also be allocated to someone joining kinship networks.
Within these parameters, land use rights combine elements of
both collective and individual. In other words, land plots can
be hereditary, or they can be allocated through a lottery
system on a yearly basis when the lopils (plots within the larger
village lands) have to be divided (Food Security Working Group
2010). In addition, households can gift, loan, rent or even sell a
plot to another cultivator residing in the community. 
Each village taungya (hilly uplands) area is divided into
lopils, with 1 cultivated by the village each year on a rotational
basis. With varying degrees of cooperation, village members
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work together to create a path to the chosen lopil, a temporary
settlement, and to fell and burn trees, after which individual
households would cultivate sub-plots. Each household typically
has access to a sub-plot each year, the size often determined by
the number of members and working adults in each household.
This is reminiscent of Chayanov’s labor-consumer ratio or the
ratio between the number of working adults and the
consumers (adults, children and elderly) (Food Security
Working Group 2010; Van der Ploeg 2013).18 
Demonstrating an intimate relationship with their land,
traditionally, hill communities set limitations on land use to
maintain ecological balance. In the past, land that was used for
five years was left to fallow for up to forty years, while plots
used for one year were left to fallow for up to nine years
(Lehman 1963: 56). According to a recent study by the local
NGO POINT, on the shifting cultivation practices in two villages
Khayaing and Lone Ein Nu in Kanpalet Township in Southern
Chin State, after one year of cultivation, the land is left for a
fallow period of between eight to nine years (2015). Another
reason that the fallow period has been preserved is out-migra-
tion from the villages to Kanpetlet, followed by migration
abroad. In addition, communities maintain other environment-
ally sustainable practices. For example, villages replant trees;
leave trees around streams to protect the watershed; around
the roads to prevent erosion; and make firebreaks when
clearing forests with fire. These findings were also echoed by
the GRET study of shifting cultivation systems in Northern
Chin State (2012). Thus, in contrast to the discourse often
employed by state planers that this slash and burn farming is
environmentally harmful, these actual practices of the hill
18 Despite a principle of access to all community households, there is variation
between villages in how land is accessed: while land plots can be allocated
through a lottery system on a yearly basis when plots within the larger village
lands have to be divided, other plots can be hereditary.
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communities—along with studies on shifting cultivation world-
wide—show that it has the potential to be environmentally
sustainable (see for example Vien et al. 2006). 
However, in other areas, it is possible that population
growth, climate change and natural disasters can put stress on
such a production system and on the environment. Villages
with rising populations—generally ones close to town settle-
ments such as Falam Township—have reduced the fallow
period to five years, reducing land fertility (GRET 2012: 27-30).19
This presents a challenge to self-provisioning, which could
explain why the state produces about 70% of the grain it needs
and hunger is common in poor households for several months
each year (IHLCA 2011). This is also the reason that the Chin
State 5-year Comprehensive Development Plan (MIID 2014)
recommends that new technologies and intensified cropping
practices, alongside diversified livelihoods, be introduced to
mitigate these problems. 
Impact of Private Property Institutions on 
Poverty and Social Relations
Before the passing of 2 land laws in 2012, the government
attempted to change the customary land systems of upland
communities several times. In 2002 the government introduced
the Upland Farm Mechanization Project. Implemented by the
Department of Agricultural Mechanization, its objective was to
transform shifting cultivation to permanent farming through
field terracing and irrigation (GRET 2012). A state fund
provided farmers with 12,000 kyat per acre to develop terra-
19 While population figures are hard to verify in the Chin State, in 2008,
population in the whole Chin state was estimated to be 533,049, with no
significant population growth (GRET 2012). In the same study—which
compared the population trends of 16 villages over the last 50 years—it was
found that the population of half of those villages remained stable, that of five
villages increased slightly, and that of the remaining three villages actually
declined. 
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cing for the 2002–2008 period. However, the Department of
Agricultural Mechanization’s 2012 report shows that much of
the 7,114 acres included in this project are not usable due to
insufficient resources allocated to the transformation of the
uplands into permanent terraces (ibid).20 The Government of
Myanmar also tried to strengthen Chin State’s participation in
the market economy. To the alarm of many local communities,
the government approved the development of a US$486.7
million Mwe Taung nickel-mine by the Chinese-owned North
Mining Investment Company, which began conducting surveys
for the project in 2012.21 
The transition to a market economy will not likely be quick
and straightforward, as the norms that undergird a moral
economy may play a role in resisting the rapid integration of
the uplands communities into capitalist markets. Hill
communities also created “an entire range of networks and
institutions outside the immediate family which may, and
often do, act as shock absorbers during economic crises in
peasant life” (ibid: 27). Such networks take the form of inter-
class reciprocity arrangements, i.e. between landlords and
their tenant, as well as intra-class reciprocity, i.e. taking the
form of communal cooperation. Intra-class reciprocity took the
form of cooperative work groups that exist to this day, which
take turns working on each family’s plot.22 Inter-class recipro-
city use to and still take the form of patron-client relationships
that allow for a fluid system of support. For example, a
landlord “is in principle required to allow his… followers to
work plots on his land rent free” or “rents are nominal and do
20 From an interview conducted by U San Thein, author of the GRET report
(August 2012) and U Swe Win, Director, Upland Farm Development Project for
Chin State, Hakha Township, 25 February 2012.
21 For more details, see: http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/chinese-backed-
nickel-mining-project-draws-concerns-chin-state.html
22 This was verified in a field trip conducted by the author in February 2013 in
the Mindat Township of the Southern Chin State.
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not comprise a share in the crop” (Lehman 1963: 77). A Chin
civil society leader whose family still owns land in Chin State
confirmed that, “My grandmother used to own hundreds of
acres near Falam. Landless neighbors would come in to use her
land without needing to inform her in advance; there was an
understanding that this was accepted and they would only
honor her with a chicken or a pot of wine.”23
With the growing presence of market forces, the hill
communities are increasingly facing threats to the production
systems that have sustained them for generations. One case
that exemplifies this threat to social welfare and livelihoods
well is the aforementioned 486.7 million US dollar Mwe Taung
copper mine project, which is 15 miles from Kalay town, at the
eastern foot of the Chin Hills. The Chinese North Mining
Investment Company owns 90% and Ministry of Mines owns
10%. The construction of this mine could negatively affect 15 to
17 villages. Many fear a repeat of the infamous Letpadaung
mine in Monywa, Sagaing Region, in which villages were forced
to move a violent crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in
2013. Many of these communities also do not see any other
feasible means of survival beyond farming.
Under the leadership of Chin Natural Resources Watch,
the Mwe Taung Development Association has also been formed
for advocacy and monitoring of the project. Efforts included
conducting an environmental social impact assessment, which
was shared with state and union parliament; public consulta-
tions including communities, religious leaders, and political
party members; and meeting with the company. Given the lack
of response from the regional parliament and from political
parties who tend to represent locally-based constituents, the
group then met with Upper House Speaker U Shwe Mann in
November 2013. He said that this development would be good
23 Author interview on 26 December 2013.
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for Chin State. Similarly, the Chief Minister, who is from the
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), said that they
need this money so that they can, in turn, get a larger budget
allocation from central government. “They only follow what
Naypidaw tells them,” said Chin Natural Resources Watch,
indicating that these leaders are not challenging the legal
authority of the central level. 
Eventually, civil society managed to get the support of the
regional Minister of Forests and Mines, who in turn convinced
central-level Forest Department to advocate the Ministry of
Mines to put a temporary halt on the project. CSOs also
convinced Chin MPs to raise questions at the parliament in
June 2014 about the lack of an environmental social impact
assessment. While the project has been halted temporarily,
villagers recognize the importance of securing legal recogni-
tion of their land and are applying for land use certificates
known as Form 7. The communities also know that without
statutory protection of their customary land systems, they face
inevitable displacement.24 
As more investments enter these remote regions, there are
signs that a small number of large land-holders who have more
information and political capital are choosing to respond to the
“insurance” offered by the markets instead of that of the
community (Popkin 1979). They are thus starting to apply for
private land titles to secure the large swaths of land to which
they lay claim.25 Members of this small elite group have also
joined the dominant ruling party (USDP), and promote the
state’s property laws over customary land laws.26 The thinking
among these elite households is further facilitated by the
migration of family members, which takes the form of
24 Author interview with Chin Natural Resources Watch on 12 February 2013.
25 From an interview conducted by the author with a large land owner in the
Mindat Township in the Southern Chin, who explained how he secured rights
to several hundred acres of land in February 2013.
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permanent movements out of the hill communities abroad
rather than the seasonal migration that seeks additional
income to maintain the household farm (for a discussion of this
phenomenon see Van der Ploeg 2013: 81-2). This results in the
return of significant levels of remittances, but not of people.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the remittances from this
migration have freed these households from the need to work
on the land as shifting cultivators.27 They are more interested
to secure their land holdings in order to sell or rent it out with
the expectation that the rental market will become more
developed.
In this evolving context, land as a form of social protection
for the low-skilled, low-educated poor with few off-farm labor
options faces increasing levels of vulnerability. In such a
context, land becomes even more valuable because “in the
absence of national welfare provisions, even a tiny patch of
land is a crucial safety net” (Li 2011: 295). Since the Govern-
ment of Myanmar’s efforts to convert shifting cultivation into
permanent terraced farming have not met with much success,
this kind of scenario is likely to increase the numbers of house-
holds that will fall into deeper poverty with less social insur-
ance to turn to. This will create more out-migration of locals,
who will join those who have already fled to urban centers or
further afield for lack of job opportunities, many settling in
neighboring countries such as Malaysia and the United States.
Ongoing research is needed to track the actual changes in
poverty levels over time.
26 From the author’s discussion held with Chin members of the USDP party in
the capital of Naypidaw in August 2013. T h e Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP) was formed on 29 March 2010 by the military-
headed State Law and Order Restoration Council to take part in the  2010
elections. 
27 From an interview conducted by author with a member of a Chin political
party in June 2014, whose own family’s efforts to secure private titles for their
land exemplify these changing relations to the land.
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The Emergence of Counter-Claims 
Political Dialogue Creates an Opening
Within the context of ethnic politics being played out, the
outcome of these state-imposed property institutions is not
going unchallenged. Since 2011, most of the cease-fires have
been signed on a state-by-state basis, some of them more
binding than others.28 As of 15 October 2015, the government,
the military, opposition parties, and eight major ethnic armed
groups, including the CNF, have so far signed a comprehensive
cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire is followed by a national
political dialogue whose aim is to create a federal union
through substantial amendments to the Constitution. In
preparation for this, 19 thematic areas for discussion have
been prioritized, among which is land—its control and adminis-
tration. 
The leaders of each ethnic group are now working on artic-
ulating their group’s position to these issues. On 15 November
2013, the Chin National Conference (CNC) was held in Hakha
with 571 delegates from the Chin State government, political
parties, civil society organizations, and religious leaders.29 Of
relevance to the issue of customary land tenure are two points
from the conference:
(1 ) The CNC urges that the State government be
allowed to play a more important role when it
comes to rights and issues related to land and
28 According to the website of the Pyidaungsu Institute, which was formed to
“provide impartial and independent spaces for building common
understanding, resources and assistance to communities in building the
Pyidaungsu,” fourteen armed groups have signed a bi-lateral Ceasefire
Agreement with the Union and State Governments since 2011. They include
the: ABSDF, ALP, CNF, DKBA, KIO, KNPP, KNU, NSCN-K, NDAA, NMSP, Pao,
RCSS, SSA-N and UWSA.
29 For more details, see the article in The Chinland Guardian. Accessed 20
December 2013 <http://chinlandguardian.com/index.php/chin-
news/item/2029-statement-of-the-chin-national-conference>
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natural resources, that priority be given to the
consent and involvement of the indigenous
people…and that transparency and accountability
be ensured when dealing with issues related to land
and natural resources;
(2) The CNC agrees that Chin tribal customary laws
be collected, documented, published, and amended
as needed in accordance with current contexts and
practices.
From these statements, it can be interpreted that different
Chin political entities want more say in the governing of their
land and natural resources, while integrating customary laws
into the way these resources are governed. They also recognize
that the customary laws under which the majority of their
communities are living might need to be reconciled with those
of statutory laws through a process of compromise with the
government.30 
Emergence of “Indigenous Claims”
Though the CNF is small in size, its executive committee
members continue to play a central role in the peace process
and potentially on land issues. In a speech made on 9 August
2015 at the second celebration of International Indigenous
People’s Day in Myanmar, the secretary general of the CNF Dr.
Sui Khar, and a member of the Asia Indigenous People’s Pact,
said that provisions in the United Nations Declaration of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) coincides with many of the
ethnic armed groups demands. The UNDRIP elaborates on
collective rights, including the right to self-determination;
rights to lands, territories and resources; and cultural rights.
Though Myanmar ratified the UNDRIP in 2007, the Government
30 This is an opinion of one of the organizing members of the Chin National
Conference. Author interview on 20 June 2014.
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of Myanmar has not enacted any substantial protections for
indigenous peoples. The IP rights discourse remains relatively
new in the country’s political discourse, but it is slowly starting
to enter into discourse of ethnic minority circles. Yet a number
of concerns remain. 
Many ethnic minorities are uncomfortable with using the
term “indigenous” for several reasons. Many believe that the
term conveys a sense of backwardness, and conjures up the
oppressed native peoples of other countries. They prefer to
emphasize ethnic minority states’ claim to sovereignty as first
envisioned in the Panglong Agreement. On the other hand,
reference to the Panglong Agreement was rejected in the
National Ceasefire Agreement negotiations, making it difficult
to re-engage with the original argument of self-governing
nation-states.
Besides the UNDRIP, Myanmar is left with few domestic
legal instruments that can be used by ethnic minorities to back
up their claims. The Constitution, the draft National Land Use
Policy, and the recently passed Ethnic Nationalities Protection
Law31 either use the term “ethnic nationality” or “national
races”—both translated as “taingyinthar.” While this term was
originally created by the Burmese majority to refer to the
ethnic minority groups, in recent decades, the term has come
to be used officially to also include the majority group. After
the Government of Myanmar ratified the UNDRIP in 2007, the
Government of Myanmar’s position is either all are indigenous
or none are indigenous—potentially weakening claims. 
Finally, some ethnic minorities say that claims based on
indigeneity could exclude many minorities who hail from a
31 The title of this law was misleading translated into English as the Indigenous
People’s Protection Law. There is only one place in Article 5 where the Ethnic
Nationalities Protection Law refers to the term “taneh taingyinthar,” where
“taneh” refers to locale and thus has been suggested as a way to say
“indigenous” in Burmese language, but this is not elaborated on in the text. 
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particularly group, but may not have been raised or live in the
original locale. This could exclude possibly half the Chin
population based outside the state. They say that if the focus is
on a common ethnic nationality, it would be easier to forge
alliances between members of an ethnic minority regardless of
where they are actually located. 
Last August 2014, members of the Nationality Brotherhood
Federation (NBF) discussed the meaning of indigeneity and the
need to find new terminology to advance ethnic minorities’
claims to land and other rights. It is evident that efforts to use
the indigenous rights discourse to protect ethnic minority
rights will still require further development. 
Role of Civil Society
While the CNF’s role may be strategic, it may face challenges in
representing the views of multiple Chin groups. 32 Civil society
provides additional counter-claims to the state’s way of admin-
istering land. With support from NGOs based in Yangon, a few
villages have started to translate communal land tenure to
approximate formal regulations.33 The aim is to survey and
register the boundaries of village land with the government.
This process requires at least three steps, which have been
piloted in villages in Chin State from mid-2013 to early 2014.
These are: 1) using GIS mapping of village’s communal lands,
both the boundaries in relation to neighboring villages as well
as ownership within each village;34 2) writing down of the
32 Interviews with an analyst who specializes in Myanmar’s ethnic minority
politics on 11 June 2014 and a tribal leader in Falam on 7 May 2015.
33 This section summarizes the main steps from a series of three research
papers on the formalization of land tenure in the Chin State conducted for the
Land Core Group in 2013-14.
34 Because the SLRD has not mapped their lands for a long time and most
villages do not have exact information on land acreage or the formal land
classification of different parcels of land, many villages continue to observe
boundaries established during the British annexation of the Chin State.
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village statutes, which define the governance structure of the
village as an organization; and 3) writing down the internal
rules for communal land management. In a few villages, the
mapping exercise only makes clearer the inherent inequality in
land ownership—legacies that cannot be easily solved. For the
most part, mapping is an initial step in a more complicated
process towards securing protection for customary land
systems.
Conclusion
This article attempts to demonstrate how the idea of
“fragmented authority” helps us to explain the dynamics of the
current contest over land access and control in Myanmar, a
regime in transition affected by decades of armed conflict
between the central government and multiple ethnic groups. It
does this by looking at the tensions produced when state and
customary property institutions interact with each other in the
uplands of Chin State.
Customary laws that have governed property institutions
in Chin State were formalized by the British in the Chin Hills
Regulation of 1896 and the Panglong Agreement of 1947. These
alternative property institutions were further solidified by the
armed struggle started by the CNF since 1988. The passage of
the 2012 Farmland and VFV Land Laws highlighted the contra-
diction between customary laws and state land laws, creating
negative impacts in the lives and livelihoods of the Chin
communities. Reflective of the dynamics of a regime in trans-
ition, the state’s property institutions are being challenged by
a host of political entities, including the Chin National Front,
Chin political parties, and civil society. 
While the idea of “fragmented authority” may seem to
imply that this phenomenon could further weaken the state’s
sovereignty, the Chin case demonstrates that the nature of its
counter-claims to the state might in fact help to cohere the
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relationship between citizens to the state. Except a few
attempts by the government to introduce terrace farming and
its approval of large-scale extractive projects to enter the state,
Chin State’s customary land systems were largely left
untouched by state law. It was only with the passage of the
Farmland Law and the VFV Law in 2012, as well as the influx of
more investments, that political entities in Chin State are
starting to engage with the process of shaping the state’s land
laws. If it were not for the government’s attempts to title land
according to a mainstream private property model—thereby
threatening the security of customary land systems—it is
unlikely that local communities in Chin State would even be
paying attention to the government’s land laws or finding ways
to secure their customary land through statutory means. 
Returning to the idea of the co-constitution of authority
and property, these initial findings in Chin State imply that the
response from Chin political entities—to engage with the
government on how state law could be used to protect
customary land—could very well strengthen state-subject
relations as these communities increasingly recognize that the
state can create and sustain property rights. Indicative of this
evolving dynamic, an executive member of the CNF recently
said that one of the reasons it signed the National Ceasefire
Agreement was to get more government support for the
recovery of Chin State after the floods in July 2015, known
among Chin people as the worse disaster in recent history.
Thus, state-building in Myanmar, as well as in other countries
where state sovereignty might be challenged by multiple insti-
tutional actors, the process of state-building is a fluid and
evolving process that shapes the way the state and its citizens
relate to one another. 
In this period of rapid transition, institutions have been
thrown into a state of flux as different state and non-state
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authorities vie to gain or maintain legitimacy in order to
continue exercising authority. The contest over property insti-
tutions will still be ongoing for some time. Since “property may
bolster claims of belonging and citizenship” (Lund 2011: 889),
one can infer that it would be in the interest of the government
to extend its sovereignty by strengthening property security
for the greatest numbers of ethnic minority populations. In the
case of the hill communities of the Chin State, this may mean
devising property institutions that can accommodate
customary land systems.
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